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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
THE CONTINENTAL BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 14109
vs.
ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a
Minnesota corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.
oooOooo
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF CASE
Continental Bank & Trust Company brought an action
as the insured against St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Company, Continental's insurer, under a banker's blanket
bond for payments made by Continental in settlement of
claims against it and for its attorney's fees and costs.
Continental also claimed reasonable attorney's fees and
costs in prosecution of the action against St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Company.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On March 24, 1975, the Third Judicial District
Court, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Judge, granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint (R. 23-4).

On May 12, 1975, the

- 2 District Court denied plaintiff's motion to alter or amend
judgment or for relief from judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Company, prays the summary judgment be affirmed and that
respondent be awarded its costs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The action of Continental Bank & Trust Company
(hereinafter "Continental") is based upon a banker's blanket
bond issued by St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company
(hereinafter "St. Paul").

Continental claims that the costs

of its defense and subsequent settlement of Clark Tank Lines
Company, Inc. and Service Tank Lines, Inc. v. Continental
Bank & Trust Co., Civil Action No. 199003, in the Third
Judicial District for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, are
covered by the bond, and that St. Paul is thus liable for
indemnification of such costs.
The second amended complaint of Clark Tank Lines
(hereinafter "Clark"), and Service Tank Lines (hereinafter
"Service"), against Continental (Exs. 130-143), alleged as
to Service, and as to Clark as indicated in brackets:
"On or about February 1, 1971 [and
February 10, 1970], J. M. Stoof presented
to defendant (Continental) the following
check of plaintiff Service [Clark]:
Date: February 1, 1971 [February 10, 1970]
Amount: $32,500 [$10,272.22]
Payee: Continental Bank & Trust Company
Drawee Bank: Old National Bank of Washington
[Clearfield State Bank] (1(1(2,18)

- 3"Defendant received said check and
negotiated the same without placing its
endorsement thereon. (1M|3,19)
"Said check was not endorsed by J. M.
Stoof or by any other person other than
banks in the collection process. (1(1(4/20)
"Said check was processed through
normal banking channels and was paid by
the drawee bank when presented. (1(1(5/21)
"Defendant received the proceeds of
said check. (1(1(6/22)
"Defendant paid over the proceeds of
said check to J. M. Stoof by:
crediting the proceeds thereof to
his personal account with defendant. (1(7)
[and by crediting the same to personal indebtedness of J. M. Stoof to
defendant] ." (1123)
Clark and Service alleged against Continental as
to each check (the emphasis is ours):
"[1] By presenting the check for
payment and receiving payment, defendant
[Continental] warranted that it had good
title to the check or was authorized to
obtain payment on behalf of one who had
good title, which warranty was false and
was breached by defendant/ causing loss
and damage to plaintiffs in the amount[s]
of $32/500 [and $10/272.22]. (1(119 and 25)
"[2] Defendant received said check
and the proceeds thereof for the use and
benefit of and on a constructive trust for
plaintiff Service [and Clark]. Defendant
breached said trust and failed to apply
such check and its proceeds for the use and
benefit of plaintiff Service [and Clark]/
causing loss and damage to plaintiffs in
the amount of $32/500 [and $10/272.22].
(1(1(11 and 27)

- 4 "[3] Defendant had no right to the
proceeds of said check and diverted the
same to its own use to the damage of plaintiffs in the amount of $32,500 [and $10,272.22].
(1M[13 and 29)
"[4] Defendant had the duty to obtain
authority from plaintiff[s] Service [and
Clark] or to inquire of plaintiff[s] Service [and Clark] as to the application of
said check and its proceeds. Defendant
negligently failed to perform such duty,
causing loss or damage to plaintiffs in
the amount of $32,500 [and $10,272.22].
(1115 and 31)
"[5] Defendant paid over the proceeds
of said check to J. M. Stoof with actual
knowledge that J. M. Stoof had no authority
to receive or direct application of the proceeds thereof, or with knowledge of such
facts that its action in this regard amounted
to bad faith to the damage of plaintiffs in
the amount of $32,500 [$10,272.22]. (111(17
and 33)"
Clark Tank Lines alleged an additional basis for
liability against Continental:
"Defendant (Continental) covenanted and
agreed that in its transactions with plaintiff Clark that it would be bound by the provisions of the resolution furnished to defendant by plaintiff Clark and defendant breached
its agreement with plaintiff Clark causing loss
and damage to plaintiff in the amount of
$10,272.22. (1(35)"
The foregoing constituted various counts of the
Clark/Service First and Second Causes of Action against
Continental based upon the two checks of $32,500 and $10,272.22,
respectively.

Continental's complaint against St. Paul is

based only on these two causes of action.

Clark also alleged

- 5claims in the Third and Fourth Causes based on two other
checks payable to Clark, as to which checks Continental
makes no claim against St. Paul.
Clark and Service also alleged in their Fifth
Cause of Action that:
"Defendant aided and abetted J. M.
Stoof in his dealings with respect to the
checks and transactions alleged in the
first through fourth causes of action,
and through its acts and omissions as
alleged prevented plaintiffs from learning
of the embezzlements and defalcations of
J. M. Stoof so that plaintiffs could have
avoided or minimized its loss from the
wrongful acts of J. M. Stoof causing
plaintiff general damages in the amount
of $600,000. (1(75)"
Authorized signatories to the Service Tank Lines
check signed the check in blank and delivered it to J. M.
Stoof who completed the check by inserting the date, amount
and payee of the check and deposited it with Continental,
which Continental applied to his personal account (R. 17).
The Clark Tank Lines check in the amount of
$10,272.22 was signed by B. Robert Clark, president of Clark
Tank Lines, in blank.

Stoof subsequently filled in the

amount and date of the check and deposited the check with
Continental, which Continental applied to his personal
account (R. 17).
Clark Tank Lines had a practice of issuing its
corporate checks to the order of Continental for the purpose

- 6of payment on personal loans or notes of Clark's officers.
Continental admitted:

(1) Check No. 2376 dated February 10,

1970, payable to Continental in the amount of $1,000, signed
by J. Moroni Stoof and M. J. Whitear, was applied to a note
in the name of Douglas Boulden and to a note in the name of
Boyce R. Clark, in the amount of $500 each; (2) Check No. C35588, dated February 13, 1970, payable to Continental in
the amount of $5,000, signed by J. Moroni Stoof and M. J.
Whitear, applied to a note in the name of Boyce R. Clark;
(3) Check No. 35889, dated February 13, 1970, in the amount
of $5,000, signed by J. Moroni Stoof and M. J. Whitear,
applied to a note in the name of Douglas L. Boulden; (4)
Check No. 1989, dated March 20, 1969, payable to Continental
in the amount of $106.25, signed by J. Moroni Stoof and
B. Robert Clark, applied to a note in the name of Douglas L.
Boulden; (5) Check No. C-36133, dated December 15, 1970,
payable to Continental in the amount of $51,071.24, signed
by A. L. Murdock and C. B. Maddis, applied $15,138.96 to a
note in the name of Boyce R. Clark, $15,138.96 to a note in
the name of Douglas L. Boulden, the remainder applied to a
note in the name of Clark Tank Lines, Inc.

(Defendant's

Answers to Interrogatories, Exs. 60, 61).
Continental, in the Service/Clark action, admitted:
"J. Moroni Stoof had authority to sign
checks on behalf of Clark Tank Lines. The
fact that Mr. Stoof had authority to sign

- 7 the checks and regularly dealt with the
bank in connection with the Clark Tank
Lines account was known to Russell Butler,
then manager of the South Temple Branch
and also to tellers and to all bookkeeping personnel having access to signature
card files. In addition, Mr. B. Robert
Clark introduced Mr. Stoof to Mr. Butler
and instructed Mr. Butler that Mr. Stoof
had full authority to act for Clark Tank
Lines in financial matters." (Defendant's
Answers to Interrogatories, Ex. 64.)
Continental has admitted that there were no irregularities in the Clark or Service checks and that each
check was accepted and processed in the ordinary course of
business.

(Defendant's Answers to Interrogatories, Ex. 65.)

In addition, Continental admitted it had no knowledge of (1)
how Stoof obtained and materially altered the Service and
Clark checks, (2) persons who acted upon Continental's
behalf in bad faith, (3) employees of Continental who converted funds to or that funds were converted to Continental' s own use, (4) employees of Continental who were dishonest, fraudulent or committed criminal acts, (5) employees
of Continental who aided and abetted in an embezzlement, or
(6) of persons who have knowledge that the Clark and Service
checks were signed in blank or were obtained, completed or
materially altered without authorization through fraudulent
misrepresentation by J. Moroni Stoof (R. 37-38).
Continental was insured by a banker's blanket bond
issued by St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company.
bond states:

The

- 8 "The St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company . . . in consideration
of agreed premiums and subject to these
Declarations and the General Conditions
of this Bond and the terms and limitations
expressed in its Insuring Clauses agrees
to indemnify the Insured . . . from and
against any losses sustained by the Insured as the result of any of the occurrences or events mentioned in the Bond . . . ."
(R. 62.)
Insuring Clause (A) , entitled, "Dishonesty,"
provides:
"The Underwriter agrees to indemnify the
Insured to any amount not exceeding the amount
stated in the Declaration for this Insuring
Clause, or endorsement amendatory thereto,
from and against any loss or any loss of
Property, brought by reason of any dishonest,
fraudulent or criminal act of any of the
Employees, wherever committed and whether
acting alone or in collusion with others . . . ."
(R. 66.)
Insuring Clause (D) of the bond provides:
"The Underwriter [St. Paul] agrees to
indemnify the Insured to any amount not
exceeding the amount stated in the Declarations for this Insuring Clause, or endorsement amendatory thereto, from and against
any loss through FORGERY OR ALTERATION of,
on or in any checks . . . ." (R. 67)
The bond also provides:
"The Underwriter will indemnify the
Insured against court costs and reasonable
attorney's fees incurred and paid by the
Insured in defending any suit or legal
proceeding brought against the Insured
to enforce the Insured's liability or alleged liability on account of any loss,
claim or damage which, if established
against the Insured would constitute a
valid and collectible loss sustained by

- 9the Insured under the terms of this bond.
Such indemnity shall be in addition to
the amount otherwise recoverable under
this bond . . . ." (R. 64)
Continental alleges in its complaint against St.
Paul that it expended $13,330.91 in attorney's fees and
costs in defense of the claims of Clark Tank Lines and
Service Tank Lines, and paid Clark Tank Lines and Service
Tank Lines $15,600 in settlement of the claims against
Continental.

On January 19, 1973, Continental commenced the

present legal action against St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company for indemnification of said amounts.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ST. PAUL IS NOT LIABLE FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES SINCE
ST. PAUL HAD NO DUTY TO DEFEND CONTINENTAL
A.

The Duty to Defend is Determined by the Allegations of the Complaint in the Clark/Service v.
Continental Action.
Continental's claim is based upon its alleged loss

through forgery or alteration of checks or by reason of a
dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of any of its employees.
However, to determine whether St. Paul had a duty to defend
Continental, the allegations of the Clark and Service Tank
Lines complaints must be considered.

Continental must show

that Clark's complaint alleged liability covered by the
bond.

Facts outside of the allegations of the complaint

cannot constitute the basis of a duty to defend.

-lost. Paul's duty to defend Continental in the Clark
Tank Lines and Service Tank Lines v. Continental matter is
dependent upon the allegations in the complaint against the
insured.

Such allegations of the Clark Tank Lines and

Service Tank Lines v. Continental complaint determine whether
there is a claim within the coverage of the policy and,
thus, a duty to defend.

McAlear v. Saint Paul Insurance

Companies, 493 P.2d 331 (Mont. 1972); see also Brown v. Green,
466 P.2d 299 (Kan. 1970); City of Burns v. Northwestern Mutual
Ins. Co., 434 P.2d 465 (Ore. 1967); McKee v. Allstate Insurance
Co., 426 P.2d 456 (Ore. 1967); Paulin v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. , 403 P.2d 555 (Ariz.App. 1965); Remitter v. Glens Falls
Indemnity Co., 295 P.2d 19 (Cal.App. 1956); Leonard v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 146 P.2d 378 (Kan. 1944).
The complaint of a third party against an insured
must state a claim within the policy coverage before an
insurer is obligated or liable to undertake the defense or
to pay for the expenses incurred in defense of an action.
The rule is stated at 14 Couch on Insurance 2d, §51:41, page
534, as follows:
"A liability insurer has no duty to
defend a suit brought by a third party
against the insured where the petition
or complaint in such suit upon its face
alleges a state of facts which fails to
bring the case within the coverage of the
policy. Consequently, the insurer is not
required to defend if it would not be
bound to indemnify the insured even though
the claim against him should prevail in
that action." (Footnote omitted.)

- 11 The burden is upon the insured in an action on an indemnity
policy to show that loss suffered comes within terms of
policy,

Waite v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 467

P.2d 847 (Wash. 1970); City of Burns v. Northwestern Mutual
Ins. Co., 434 P.2d 465 (Ore. 1967).

The allegations of

Clark Tank Lines and Service Tank Lines in their action
against Continental must be within the policy coverage
before St. Paul has any duty to defend under the blanket
banker's bond.
This Court, on at least two occasions, has indicated its support of the principal that the allegations of
the third party against the insured must be within the
coverage of the bond before the insurer has a duty to defend.
In State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company v. Kay, 26 U.2d
195, 487 P.2d 852 (1971), the insurer brought a declaratory
judgment action to determine its liability and duty to
defend its insured.

The trial court held that since the

insurer had assumed the defense, it could not deny coverage
because to do so would prejudice the insured.

This Court

reversed, holding that the insurer, in declining to continue
its defense, by notifying the insured sufficiently in advance to prepare a defense, and by bringing the declaratory
judgment action did not prejudice the insured*
its decision, the Court stated:

In reaching

- 12 11

[W] here the facts alleged in a complaint
against the insured support a recovery for
an occurrence covered by the policy, even
though the insurer has knowledge that the
injury is not in fact so covered, it is the
insurer's duty to defend, unless relief is
obtained by way of a declaratory judgment."
26 U.2d at 199. (Footnote omitted; emphasis added.)
The insurer initiated the declaratory judgment action because the facts alleged in the third party complaint were
within the policy coverage and the insurer thus on the face
of it might have been required to defend, but when in fact
the injury was not covered because of a policy exclusion,
the declaratory judgment procedure was followed by the
insurer to establish there was no duty to defend.

The point

of the Kay case is that one must look initially to the facts
alleged in the third party complaint to determine whether
the insurer has any duty to defend under the policy.
In Rasmussen v. Western Casualty and Surety Co.,
15 U.2d 333, 393 P.2d 376 (1964), the insured brought a
declaratory judgment action to determine his rights under
the insurance policy.

The trial court found the insurer

obligated to defend the insured in the action against him.
This Court affirmed and stated:
"Coverage B—'Property Damage Liability—Automobile'—protects the named
insured as to damages 'caused by accident
and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any automobile.' The
only qualifications of Coverage B, applicable to the instant case, are that the

- 13 named insured have the use of the automobile involved and be held liable therefor.
The complaint in the negligence action
pending against plaintiffs alleges such
control by C. Wesley Rasmussen as would
make his use of the automobile within the
purview of Coverage B. If these allegations are ultimately proved, so that his
liability is predicated on his use or control of the vehicle, he is protected under
this coverage.
"The appellant argues that in no
event could Wesley be held liable in
damages for the accident; this contention evades the question of coverage.
The issue before this court does not
involve any determination of liability
but the protection extended by the insurance contract." 15 U.2d at 335. (Emphasis added.)
The allegations of the complaint against the insured, not
his ultimate liability/ were found to determine the insurer's
duty to defend.

The allegations were within policy coverage

and the insurer required to defend.

Conversely, if the

allegations of the third party against the insured are not
within policy coverage, the insurer has no duty to defend.
B.

The Allegations of the Third Party Complaint Are
Not Within the Coverage of the Bond.
The allegations of the Clark Tank Lines and Ser-

vice Tank Lines complaint do not state a claim within the
banker's blanket bond.

The Service and Clark Tank Lines

complaints alleged that each of two checks, each drawn on
banks other than Continental, were presented by J. M. Stoof,
each was processed through normal banking channels without

- 14 Continental's endorsement, each check was paid and Continental received payment and credited the amount to Stoof's
personal account or his indebtedness to Continental.

As a

result of these facts, Service and Clark claimed (1) Continental breached its warranty of title (11119, 25; Exs. 132,
134), (2) Continental breached its constructive trust to
Service and Clark (111111, 27; Exs. 133, 135), (3) Continental
converted the proceeds of the checks to its own use (111(13,
29; Exs. 133, 135), (4) Continental was negligent in failing
to obtain authority from Service and Clark or inquiring as
to the application of the checks and their proceeds (111(15,
31; Exs. 133, 135), (5) Continental paid the proceeds to
J. M. Stoof with actual knowledge that J. M. Stoof lacked
authority or under circumstances constituting bad faith
(1(1(17, 33; Exs. 133, 135), and (6) Continental aided and
abetted J. M. Stoof in connection with all the checks and
transactions alleged among the defendant banks, preventing
Clark and Service from learning of Stoof's actions (1(75; Ex.
142).

In addition, Clark alleged Continental breached its

agreement in not abiding with the corporate resolution
furnished to Continental.

The allegations of the Clark and

Service Tank Lines complaints in no way allege forgery or
alteration of checks, nor dishonesty of Continental's employees, the alleged basis of Continental's claim as set
forth in its complaint against St. Paul.

- 15 Even the Statement of Facts of Continental in its
Brief on Appeal indicates that the allegations of Clark and
Service Tank Lines are not within the coverage of the bond.
Continental's Statement of Facts in connection with the
Clark and Service Tank Lines complaint, that J. M. Stoof
presented two checks to Continental, states:
"With respect to each such check,
plaintiffs alleged that the bank wrongfully paid or credited the proceeds of
the check to J. M. Stoof, converted the
check to its own use, had actual knowledge that J. M. Stoof had no authority
to receive the proceeds of the check and
credited the checks to J. M. Stoof in
bad faith. . . . In the fifth cause
of action plaintiffs alleged that the
bank aided and abetted J. M. Stoof in
his dealings with respect to said checks
and transactions and through its acts
and omissions prevented plaintiff from
learning of the embezzlements and defalcations of J. M. Stoof so that plaintiff
could have avoided or minimized their
losses from the wrongful acts of J. M.
Stoof. (Emphasis added.)
Nowhere is there an allegation by Service or Clark Tank
Lines against Continental that their claims were based upon
or caused by a forgery or alteration of a check or by reason
of a dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of an employee of
Continental.

Rather, Continental has characterized the

Clark/Service allegations in an attempt to bring the Clark/
Service complaint within the coverage of the bond when in
fact the Clark/Service complaint made no such allegations.

- 16 C.

Continental's Potential or Alleged Liability to
Clark Tank Lines and Service Tank Lines Was Not
Covered by the Bond.
As discussed in Point I.A above, the allegations

of the third party complaint determine the duty to defend.
Facts revealed during the course of discovery do not change
the principle that the allegations of the complaint against
the insured must be within the coverage of the policy before
there is a duty to defend.

Nevertheless, Continental's

description of the facts in its brief describes the results
of Continental's discovery in the Clark and Service Tank
Lines action.

Elsewhere in the brief, Continental relies

upon the facts as discovered in the Service and Clark Tank
Lines action to support its claim against St. Paul.

See

Brief of Appellant, §1.A, pp. 9-10, §1.C, p. 17, §1.E, p.
22, and §2, p. 25. Continental attempts to ignore the
pleadings of the Clark and Service Tank Lines complaint and
relies upon facts discovered in the course of the litigation
of that action.

However, St. Paul's duty to defend is based

only upon the complaint of Clark and Service Tank Lines and
not upon such facts as may have been discovered by Continental during the course of the litigation.
In Isenhart v. General Casualty Co. of America,
377 P.2d 26 (Ore. 1962), an action to recover damages for
the alleged breach of a contract of insurance where the
insurer declined the defense of an assault and battery
action, the Court held:

- 17 "In accordance with the weight of
authority, we have held that the obligation of the insurer to defend is to be
determined by the allegations of the complaint filed against the insured, we
adhere to this view. The insurer contracts to indemnify the insured within
certain limits stated in the policy.
If the facts alleged in the complaint
against the insured do not fall within
the coverage of the policy, the insurer
should not have the obligation to defend.
If a contrary rule were adopted, requiring
the insurer to take note of facts other
than those alleged, the insurer frequently
would be required to speculate upon whether
the facts alleged could be proved. We do
not think that this is a reasonable interpretation of the bargain to defend. It is
more reasonable to assume that the parties
bargained for the insurer's participation
in the lawsuit only if the action brought
by the third party, if successful, would
impose liability upon the insurer to indemnify the insured."
It is irrelevant that the insured or the insurer
may have other information or facts besides those alleged in
the complaint.

In Ferguson v. Birmingham Fire Insurance Co.,

460 P.2d 342 (Ore. 1968), the Court cited Isenhart, supra,
and stated:
"The insurer's knowledge of facts not
alleged in the complaint is irrelevant in
determining the existence of the duty to
defend and consequently the insurer need
not speculate as to what the 'actual facts'
of the alleged occurrence may be." (Footnote
omitted.) 460 P.2d 346.
In United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Nat.
Ins. Co., 185 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1950), the insurance
policy covered premises used for the retail sale of clothing

- 18 or wearing apparel.

The insured began handling stoves,

heaters, refrigerators, butane gas appliances and propane
gas.

A fire was caused by a defective gas container, re-

sulting in extensive damage to the insured building and
adjoining premises. A declaratory judgment action was
brought by the insured to determine liability of the insurer
under the policy.

The Court on appeal, construing Utah law,

reversed the trial's court's finding of policy coverage and
held that only damages resulting from the operation of a
retail sports store, selling clothing or wearing apparel,
was within policy coverage.

On the point of attorney's

fees, the Court held that none were owed the insured by the
insurer, where the loss is not within policy coverage, and
stated:
"The rule is that under such provisions, the company is bound to defend only
suits alleging a cause of action which brings
the case within the coverage of the policy.
The company is not bound to defend any action
not falling within the coverage of the policy."
(Footnote omitted.)
In Midland Const. Co. v. United States Cas. Co.,
214 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1954), the Court held that a construction company's alleged liability was not within the
coverage of the insurance policy.

As to the insurer's duty

to defend, the Court stated:
"Although the policy required the
casualty company to defend suits brought
against the insured, even if such suit
is groundless, false or fraudulent, it
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to allege facts which, if established,
create liability within the policy, no
duty rests upon the insurance company
to defend the action or pay a judgment
obtained therein." (Footnote omitted.)
214 F.2d 667.
See also Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Mason-Moore-Tracy, Inc.,
194 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1952); United States Fid. & Guar. Co.
v. Reinhart & Donovan Co., 171 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1948).
Where there is a conflict between the allegations
of the third party complaint and the known or ascertainable
facts, there is a split of authority regarding the duty to
defend.

The annotation, "Allegations in Third Person's

Actions

Against Insured as Determining Liability Insurer's

Duty to Defend," 50 A.L.R.2d 458 (1956), cites the following
jurisdictions as holding that the insurer may look exclusively to the allegations of the complaint: California,
District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York,
Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina.

50 A.L.R.2d at 498.

The following jurisdictions are cited as following the rule
that actual facts within the knowledge of the insurer are
determinative:
Texas.

Missouri, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,

Even under the theory that facts are determinative,

the known or knowable facts must create at least the potential for liability within the coverage of the insuring
policy before the insurer has the duty to defend.

As seen

- 20 in the discussion of Point III of this Brief, Continental
was not liable even under the known or knowable facts•

In

addition, the bond itself supports the rule that the allegations are determinative, where it provides that the insurer will indemnify the insured against costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred
"in defending any suit or legal proceeding
brought against the Insured to enforce the
Insured's liability or alleged liability on
account of any loss, claim or damage which,
if established against the Insured would
constitute a valid and collectible loss
sustained by the Insured under the terms
of this bond." (R. 64.)
If the allegations of the complaint are not within the
coverage of the bond, there can be no "liability or alleged
liability . . . which . . . would constitute a valid and
collectible loss sustained by the Insured under the terms of
this bond."

Thus, the allegations, not the known or know-

able facts, are properly determinative.
The Rules of Civil Procedure concerning requirements of a complaint are instructive as to the interpretation which must be given the Clark/Service complaint.
Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states in part:
"A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall
contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."

This Court

has construed that rule to mean that "the basic facts must
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facts are claimed to constitute such charges."

Heathman v.

Hatch, 13 U.2d 266, 372 P.2d 990 (1962).
St. Paul is entitled to rely upon the allegations
of the Clark/Service complaint as constituting the claims
against Continental.

If the complaint is not specific

enough, a party may request a more definite statement under
Rule 12(e) or may move to dismiss if the plaintiff would be
entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could
be proved in support of the claim.
U.2d 157, 280 P.2d 453 (1955).

Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3

But St. Paul is not required

to go beyond the face of the complaint, to speculate as to
the "true facts," or to speculate as to what action on the
part of Continental may give rise to liability within the
bond coverage if not stated in the complaint.

Specifically,

the bond provides that the complaint must be considered in
determining the duty to defend where the bond states:
"The Underwriter will indemnify the
Insured against court costs and reasonable
attorney's fees incurred and paid by Insured in defending any suit or legal proceeding brought against the Insured to
enforce the Insured's liability or alleged
liability on account of any loss, claim or
damage which, if established against the
Insured, would constitute a valid and collectible loss sustained by the Insured
under the terms of this bond." (Emphasis added.)

- 22 The bond, providing protection for "alleged liability . . .
which, if established would constitute a valid . . . loss
. . . under the terms of this bond," requires that the
complaint be controlling as to the issue whether the alleged
loss is within the coverage of the bond.

A defendant's

alleged liability is not determined by extrinsic or unpleaded
facts.

If newly discovered facts give rise to additional

bases of liability or reveal previously pleaded facts to be
erroneous or inaccurate, a complaint may be amended.
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

See

This is why the

Second Amended Complaint of Clark and Service is the operative complaint.
Simple examination of the Clark/Service complaint
reveals no allegation or statement of fact that there was
any alteration or forgery of the checks involved or that an
employee of Continental committed any dishonest, fraudulent
or criminal act in dealing with or processing the check.

On

the contrary, the complaint says "said check was processed
through normal banking channels and was paid by the drawee
bank when presented."
The Clark/Service complaint is similar to the complaint considered by this Court in Heathman v. Hatch, 13
U.2d 266, 372 P.2d 990 (1962).

In that case, the plaintiff

sued the defendant, an attorney, for alleged wrongs arising
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The

defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaintf which
motion was granted.

In considering the plaintiff's appeal,

Justice Crockett, for the Court, stated:
"[T]he nature of the grievances which the
plaintiff complains about is that the
defendant was guilty of 'fraud,' 'conspiracy, ' and negligence': (1) in representing the plaintiff in connection with
the criminal charges; (2) in failing to
enforce his 'possessory lien1 against
the automobile and parts which he was
accused of stealing; and (3) in failing
to sue the complaining witness, Ivan
Bland, and others, for filing and prosecuting the criminal charge. It is to
be noted that the terms 'fraud,' 'conspiracy' and 'negligence' are but general
accusations in the nature of conclusions
of the pleader. They will not stand up
against a motion to dismiss on that ground.
The basic facts must be set forth with sufficient particularity to show what facts
are claimed to constitute such charges."
The Clark/Service complaint sets out certain facts concerning Continental's receipt and processing of the checks and
in the various counts within each cause of action alleges
liability for breach of warranty of title, breach of constructive trust, conversion, negligence, knowledge of lack
of authority or bad faith, breach of contract, and aiding
and abetting.

No additional facts are alleged in the var-

ious counts of each cause of action.

Rather, the only facts

alleged are as to the presentation of the checks to Continental and Continental's processing of the checks. This
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of Civil Procedure:

"Relief in the alternative or of sev-

eral different types may be demanded."
The duty of St. Paul to defend, if any, must be
determined from examination of the facts as alleged by Clark
and Service.

Such facts are that J. M. Stoof presented, at

different times, two checks to Continental, each drawn on
another bank, that each check was processed through normal
banking channels without Continental's endorsement and paid
by the drawee bank; Continental received payment and credited the amount to Stoofs personal account or his indebtedness to Continental.

There is no allegation that the check

was altered or forged.

There is no allegation that any

employee of Continental committed any dishonest, fraudulent
or criminal act.
On the face of the complaint, it is clear that St.
Paul had no duty to defend Continental.

The allegations of

the Clark/Service complaint were not within the coverage of
the bond.

The Clark/Service complaint was before the trial

court, and whether the allegations of the Clark/Service complaint were within bond coverage is a question of law.
Continental cannot, ex post facto, look to facts beyond the
complaint which, had they been pleaded in the Clark complaint, would have brought the Clark allegations within the
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Isenhart v. General Casualty Co. of America, supra; Ferguson
v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., supra.

The trial court's award

of judgment to St. Paul was correct, there being no issues
of material fact, and St. Paul is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
POINT II
FOR AN INSURER TO BE LIABLE TO PAY FOR A
SETTLEMENT MADE BY THE INSURED, THE CLAIM WHICH
IS MADE AGAINST THE INSURED MUST BE WITHIN THE
POLICY COVERAGE
A.

Where the Insurer Justifiably Refuses to Defend a
Claim Against Its Insured, It Is Not Guilty of a
Breach of Contract and No Liability Attaches to
Its Refusal to Defend.
If the defense is justifiably declined, any subse-

quent settlement entered into by or judgment taken against
the insured does not create any liability upon the insurer.
The rule is stated in 14 Couch on Insurance 2d, §51:51, page
544:
"Where the insurer refuses to defend
an action brought against the insured,
basing its refusal on the ground that it
is under no duty to defend, because the
claim upon which the action against the
insured is founded is not within the
coverage of the policy, and it appears
that such claim actually is outside the
policy coverage, the refusal of the insurer to defend does not constitute a
breach of contract but, on the contrary,
is a justified refusal, and the insurer
incurs no liability by its action."
(Footnote omitted.)

- 26 In McAlear v. St, Paul Insurance Companies, 493
P.2d 331 (Mont. 1972), the insured McAlear was sued by the
owner of an airplane allegedly damaged by McAlearfs negligence.

McAlear, an attorney, had a professional liability

policy with his insurer, St. Paul Insurance Companies, and
tendered defense of the action to the insurer.

St. Paul

denied the tender of the defense, claiming that the policy
afforded no coverage because injury to or destruction of
tangible property, including the loss of use thereof, was
specifically excluded from the policy.

The Court held that

the allegations in the complaint against the insured determine whether there is coverage under the policy, and since
the complaint against the insured was outside the scope of
the policy, there was no duty to defend and no liability of
the insurer to pay the claim made against the insured.
In MacDonald v. United Pacific Insurance Company,
311 P.2d 425 (Ore. 1957), the insured brought an action
against his insurer for failure to undertake the defense of
a criminal assault and battery action and for a civil assault
and battery action, arising out of the same altercation.
The insurer denied coverage and declined the tender of the
defense, whereafter the insured settled the civil action
and, with the assistance of legal counsel, was successful in
having the criminal complaint dismissed.

The insured insti-

tuted the action against the insurer for attorney's fees and
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paid in settlement of the civil action.

The Court held that

where the policy excluded injury caused intentionally by or
at the direction of the insured, that the insurer had no
duty to defend and was not liable for the amount for which
the insured settled the civil action.

In reaching its

decision, the Court stated:
"Such an action was outside the
general coverage of the policy whether
it was a valid claim or was false and
fraudulent. Defendant had no duty to
defend. The settlement made with the
plaintiffs in the assault action was
also for an injury not covered by the
policy. The defendant United Pacific
Insurance Company is not liable either
for failing to defend or for refusing
to pay the amount paid by plaintiff in
settlement. Plaintiff argues at great
length that the insured should have the
opportunity to present his case in
court when he alleges that third party
suits are false and fraudulent. We
agree that if a suit is brought against
the insured alleging acts which are
within the coverage of the policy, the
insurer must defend, whether the suits
are or are not false and fraudulent.
But this is not such a case."
The case at bar is very similar to the MacDonald
case in that issues presented for decision by the trial
court are identical:

(1) Was the defendant under a duty to

assume the defense of the plaintiff; and (2) was it under a
duty to pay to plaintiff the amounts paid by plaintiff in
settlement of the suits?

Because the allegations of the
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the banker's bond, St. Paul, like the insurer in MacDonald,
had no duty to assume the defense of Continental and had no
duty to pay the amount paid by the insurer in settlement of
the suit.

See Cagle v. Home Insurance Co., 483 P.2d 592

(Ariz.App. 1971).
The MacDonald case is additionally similar to the
case at bar.

In MacDonald the insured asserted his inno-

cence upon the various charges of assault and battery and
alleged the insurer "knew that he had a valid defense 'in
that he was protecting his property and person.'"

He also

claimed the insurer knew that any injuries inflicted by him,
if any, were accidental and unintentional, and the insurer
was thus obligated to defend.

Negligent or intentional

bodily injury was within policy coverage.

Nonetheless, the

allegations of the third party complaints, being outside the
scope of coverage, the insurer had no liability for the
insured's settlements or costs of defense and was granted
summary judgment.

Similarly, in claiming against St. Paul

that the loss was within bond coverage, Continental can at
best only theorize that Clark's loss could have been caused
by a dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of an employee,
by forgery, or by alteration.

However, because Clark did

not allege such cause or causes of loss, the trial court
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Similarly, in Isaacson Iron Works v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp., 70 P.2d 1026 (Wash. 1937), the insured,
a subcontractor, had been sued by the general contractor,
had tendered the defense to the insurer, which declined the
defense, and a judgment was taken against the insured.

The

Court, stating "the burden rested upon [insured] to show
that the loss which it suffered comes within the terms of
the policy" held that the claim was not covered by the
policy and the insurer was not responsible for the insurer's
expenses in defending the prior suit.

See also Waite v.

Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 467 P.2d 847 (Wash.
1970).
In Zipperer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
Co., 254 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1958), an action was brought by
a passenger in an automobile against the owner.

Judgment

was rendered in favor of the passenger, and the passenger
caused a writ of garnishment to be issued against the insurance company as garnishee, claiming the owner's insurer was
obligated under the terms of the policy contract to pay the
amount of the judgment.

The garnishment action was removed

to the federal court, where summary judgment was granted in
favor of the garnishee insurance company.

On appeal, the

Court affirmed the district court decision and stated:
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are in agreement that where the insurer
justifiably refuses to defend on the
grounds that the claim upon which the
action is based is not within the coverage
of the policy, it is not guilty of a
breach of contract and no legal liability
attaches to its action. Where, as here,
the policy requires the insurer to defend
suits brought against the insured, even
if such suit is groundless, false or
fraudulent, it is the law that if the
complaint fails to allege facts which,
if established, create liability within
the policy, no duty rests upon the insurance company to defend the action or to
pay a judgment obtained therein."
See also Mann v. Mann, 273 N.E.2d 40 (Ill.App. 1971).
St. Paul is not liable to Continental for any
settlement which Continental made with Clark and Service
Tank Lines because the Clark/Service complaint does not
state a claim which is within the coverage of the bond.

The

discussion of the complaint and the coverage of the bond is
set forth in detail under Point I of this brief.

In sum-

mary, where the insurer justifiably refuses to defend its
insured, it is not guilty of a breach of contract and no
liability attaches to its action.
The rule is stated in 7A Appleman, Insurance Law
and Practice, §4684, page 448:
"Since the insurer's duty to defend ordinarily is correlative with its duty to pay
a judgment which might be obtained against
the insured, it is apparent that the insurer
has the duty of defending only those actions that are within the terms of the policy
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Continental for a judgment or settlement on a claim not
within the policy coverage,

St, Paul's refusal to defend

was justified, and Continental suffered no loss which was
within policy coverage.
B.

Continental, in its Brief on Appeal, Incorrectly
States the Rules Concerning the Insurer's Liability under the Bond.
Continental, in its Brief on Appeal, in several

places states that its complaint against St. Paul is the
operative document determining St. Paul's duty under the
bond.

See Point I.C, p. 17, and Point I.E, p. 22, Brief of

Appellant.

Point II of Continental's brief states:

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR ST.
PAUL BECAUSE THEY BANK IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON THE FACE OF THE PLEADING UNLESS
ST. PAUL DISPUTES THE BANK'S GOOD FAITH
IN MAKING SETTLEMENT OF THE CLAIMS AGAINST
THE BANK711 (Emphasis added.)
As indicated in Points I and II.A of this Brief, the third
party complaint against the insured determines the insurer's
duty to defend.

The insured's characterization of the

allegations of the third party complaint cannot be substituted for the third party allegations themselves.

Thus,

Continental cannot recover from St. Paul merely by characterizing the Clark/Service allegations as within the bond
coverage when the allegations are not, in fact, within the
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The trial court was entitled to view

the Clark/Service allegations and determine, independently
of Continental's paraphrase or characterization of such
allegations whether, as a matter of law, they alleged facts
within the coverage of the bond.
Continental asserts that its allegations are
dispositive of all issues.

However, in taking such a posi-

tion, Continental ignores the requirements of the authority
cited above.

Continental has failed to show, and cannot

show, that the allegations of the Clark/Service complaint
were within the coverage of the bond.

The resulting settle-

ment was for claims not covered and, therefore, St. Paul is
not liable for the cost of settlement.
failed to cross the threshold issue:

Continental has

That the claims of

Clark and Service were covered by the bond.

Its inability

to cross that threshold, as a matter of law, precludes any
liability of St. Paul to Continental.
Continental's brief also states:

"St. Paul's only

possible defense to the Bank's claims . . . is that the
Bank's settlement was not in good faith."
lant, p. 27.)

(Brief of Appel-

Again, Continental assumes proof of a fact

not proved and which cannot be proven because the Clark/
Service complaint does not allege facts within bond coverage.

Furthermore, as indicated in Point III of this brief,
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because under any possible theory Continental was not liable
to Clark or Service for losses covered by the bond.
In summary, Continental's statements of points
cannot be taken as a correct statement of applicable law.
It is true that a duty to defend, and liability if the duty
is refused, are not contingent upon a finding that the
insured in fact committed an act covered by the bond, but
the duty ijs contingent upon the complaint against the insured, not the complaint against the insurer, alleging
liability within coverage of the insuring policy.

See the

authorities cited by Continental, such as Russ-Field Corp.
v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 330 P.2d 432 (Cal.App.
1958), where the Court found that the claim against the
insured was within the coverage of the policy and that the
insurer was liable for the insured's good faith settlement.
Also, in Lamb v. Belt Casualty Co., 40 P.2d 311 (Cal.App.
1935), it was stated:
"In determining whether or not the
appellant was bound to defend, its denial
of liability and refusal to defend, based
upon its own investigation of the facts
in the case, are to be disregarded. The
language of its contract must first be
looked to, and next the allegations of
the complaints in each action for damages
against the insured. The complaint clearly
alleges damages resulting from an alleged
negligent operation of the truck, and the
policy in unmistakable language binds the
insurer to defend every such action even
though the same be groundless." (40 P.2d
at 314; emphasis added.)

- 34 The Clark/Service allegations are not within the coverage of
the bond, and St. Paul incurs no liability for Continental's
settlement or the costs of defending the suit against Continental.
POINT III
THE LOSS MUST RESULT FROM A RISK WITHIN THE COVERAGE
OF THE BOND BEFORE THE INSURER HAS ANY LIABILITY FOR A
SETTLEMENT MADE BY ITS INSURED
The banker's blanket bond is specific that the
insurer's liability results from a loss sustained by the
insured by reason of the insured occurrences, such as dishonesty of employees, forgery or alteration.
Clause A, the bond provides:

In Insuring

"The Underwriter agrees to

indemnify the Insured . . . from and against any loss . . .
by reason of any dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of
any of the employees . . . ."
of the bond provides:

Similarly, Insuring Clause D

"The Underwriter agrees to indemnify

the Insured . . . from and against any loss through FORGERY
OR ALTERATION of, on or in any checks . . . ."

Thus, if a

loss is sustained from a cause other than one included in
and covered by the banker's blanket bond, the insurer has no
liability for its insured's loss.
A.

The Complaint Against the Insured Provides the
Basis for Determining if the Loss is Within the
Coverage of the Bond.
As discussed at length in Point II of this brief,

an insurer is not liable to its insured for a settlement
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the claim against the insured is not within the policy
coverage.

Similarly, no loss is sustained within the cover-

age of the bond where the complaint against the insured does
not state a claim within the bond coverage.

As discussed

above, St. Paul had no liability to Continental because
Continental's loss was not within coverage of the policy.
B.

The Insured Must Show That It Was or Could Have
Been Liable for the Claim of the Third Party.
Where a complaint against an insured fails to

state a cause of action within the policy coverage of its
bond, and where the insured claims the settlement was based
upon facts as discovered during the course of the lawsuit
which bring the loss within the terms of the policy coverage , the insured must be able to show some facts under which
it might have been liable to the third party for the loss to
be covered by the bond.

It is clear, as discussed in Points

I and II of this brief, that the complaint of Clark and
Service Tank Lines against Continental did not state claims
within the policy coverage of the banker's blanket bond.
However, Continental's complaint and its argument contend that
its loss was suffered under an insuring clause of the bond,
Insuring Clause A or Insuring Clause D.

Assuming, arguendo,

that St. Paul must do more than stated in Points I and II of
this brief, which Points St. Paul submits correctly state
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show it was or could have been liable under the "true facts"
of the case before St. Paul is liable.

The contract of the

surety being one of indemnity against loss requires proof of
loss as a proximate result of a risk covered by the insuring
contract, and absence of such proof of loss is a defense to
the surety.

Aetna Casualty & S. Co. v. Phoenix Nat. Bank &

T. Co., 285 U.S. 214, 76 L.Ed. 713 (1932); Piedmont Fed. S.&L.
Assn. v. Hartford, 307 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1962).

If Conti-

nental was not or could not have been liable to Clark and
Service Tank Lines as a matter of law for an occurrence
within the coverage of the bond, then Continental suffered
no insurable loss.

Continental refers to this as the "good

faith" issue, that is, if the settlement was in good faith,
it is entitled to indemnification from St. Paul.

If the

facts, even as alleged in Continental1s complaint against
St. Paul, do not establish any possible basis for Continental's liability or potential liability, can any settlement
have been made in good faith?

The required answer is no.

As will be shown below, Continental could not have been
liable to Clark or Service Tank Lines for a dishonest act of
an employee or for alteration of a check for the following
reasons:
1.

The record shows Continental was not liable as

a matter of law to Service and Clark Tank Lines for an
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Continental's Answers to St. Paul's Interrogatories show Continental has no knowledge of facts which
would create liability on the part of Continental to Clark
or Service Tank Lines, which liability would be within the
coverage of the policy.

Continental admitted, in material

part, the following:
"Plaintiff has no independent knowledge of persons who have knowledge that
the checks alleged in the First Cause of
Action were signed in blank or were obtained, completed, or materially altered
without authorization through fraudulent
misrepresentation by J. Moroni Stoof.
Plaintiffs and their attorneys in the
action [Clark and Service Tank Lines v.
Continental] have claimed to have such
knowledge.

"Plaintiff has no independent understanding of [how Stoof obtained and materially
altered said checks without authorization,
and of the fraudulent misrepresentations he
made].

" . . . Plaintiff knows of no persons
who acted upon plaintiff's behalf in bad
faith and with actual knowledge of Stoof's
lack of authority.

". . . Plaintiff knows of no employees
of plaintiff who aided and abetted in the
embezzlement.
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who converted funds to its use nor does it
know of funds which were converted to its
own use.
. . .

" . . . Plaintiff knows of no employees
of plaintiff who were dishonest, fraudulent
or acted or committed criminal acts in
connection with the subject matter of this
action." (R. 37-38)
In its supplemental answers, Continental referred
to depositions in the Clark/Service v. Continental lawsuit
and "oral inquiry of . . . one of the attorneys for Clark
Tank Lines, as to the factual basis for such allegation," of
dishonesty (R-3).

This unsupported, conclusionary hearsay

cannot withstand Continental's sworn admissions in its
Answers to Interrogatories, quoted above, that Continental
knows of no employees who converted funds, who aided and
abetted an embezzlement, or who were dishonest, fraudulent,
or committed a criminal act.

In addition, in the Clark/

Service action, in Answers to Interrogatories, Continental
admitted that there were no irregularities as to the checks
or their processing by the employees (Ex. 65). No specific
facts were given in the Supplemental Answers in support of
Continental's, but not Clark's, dishonesty allegation.

As

discussed below, the facts regarding alteration as set forth
in the supplemental answers or any other facts in the Clark/
Service action could not result in judgment against Continental
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Obviously, the complete absence of

facts to establish dishonesty of an employee of Continental
is not sufficient to establish Continental's liability as a
matter of law, to Clark, for dishonest employees, or to even
create a genuine issue of fact as to such.
2.

The claims of Clark and Service were barred by

their own negligence in executing the instruments.

Section

70A-3-406, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"Any person who by his negligence
substantially contributes to a material
alteration of the instrument or to the
making of an unauthorized signature is
precluded from asserting the alteration
or lack of authority against a holder in
due course or against a drawee or other
payor who pays the instrument in good
faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's
or payor's business." (Emphasis added.)
According to Continental, the checks in issue here were paid
in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of Continental's business.

In answer to

interrogatories in the Clark/Service action, Continental
identified no irregularity in the checks or the manner in
which they were processed.

(See plaintiff's Interrogatories

to Defendant, No. 13, Ex. 22, and Defendant's Answers to
Interrogatories, No. 13, Ex. 65.)

In addition, J. Moroni

Stoof had full authority to act for Clark Tank Lines in
financial matters, and Continental admitted it so understood
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Interrogatories, No. 10, Ex. 64.)

(Defendant's Answers to
Further, it was common

practice for Clark corporate checks, payable to Continental,
to be applied to personal indebtedness of officers and
directors of Clark.

(Defendant's Answers to Interrogatories,

No. 5, Ex. 60, 61.)

Thus, the checks were paid in good

faith in accordance with Continental's reasonable commercial
standards.
The negligence which substantially contributed to
a material alteration of an instrument in the present case
is that authorized signatories of both Clark and Service
Tank Lines signed the checks in question in blank and delivered them to J. M. Stoof (R. 17). That signing a check
in blank is negligence which substantially contributes to a
material alteration of the instrument is supported by the
official comment to the Uniform Commercial Code, §70A-3-406,
U.C.A. 1953, which states:
11

[This section] adopts the doctrine of
Young v. Grote, 4 Bing 253 (1827), which
held that a drawer who so negligently
draws an instrument as to facilitate its
material alteration is liable to a drawee
who pays the altered instrument in good
faith."
In Young v. Grote, checks were signed in blank by the drawer
and left with the drawer's wife to facilitate continuation
cf the drawer's business in his absence.

See Bailey, Brady

- 41 on Bank Checks, 4th Ed. 1969, §14.7, pp. 430-31; Leonard v.
National Bank of West Virginia, 145 S.E.2d 23 (W.Va.

);

Pacific Coast Cheese v. Security First Nat. Bank, 273 P.2d
547 (Cal.App. 1954).

In Rancho San Carlos v. Bank of Italy

Nat. Trust & S. Ass'n, 11 P.2d 424 (Cal. 1932), the Court
stated:
"It is the rule that, if one signs an
instrument containing blanks, he must intend
it to be filled in by the person to whom it
is delivered (Cassetta v. Beaima, 106 Cal.App.
196, 288 Pac. 830); and where a depositor
signs checks in blank and delivers the same
to its agent, who fraudulently fills in the
blanks and negotiates the checks, the drawee
bank which pays the same without notice of
the fraud is not liable to the drawor, since
the negligence of the latter is the proximate
cause of the loss." 11 P.2d at 425. (Citations omitted.)
The official comment to the Uniform Commercial
Code states:

"Negligence usually has been found where

spaces are left in the body of the instrument in which words
or figures may be inserted."

In U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty

Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 137 S.E.2d 582 (S.C.

) , a case

very similar to the case at bar, principal officers of the
company signed blank checks permitting the bookkeeper to
raise the amounts and insert names of payees, enabling her
to embezzle the company's money.

The Court held that the

officer's negligence in executing the checks in blank and in
failing to timely examine cancelled checks and bank statements absolved the drawee bank from liability.

(On the
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Section 70A-3-406 does not create a comparative or
contributory negligence standard available to the bank as a
defense, but the negligence contributing to a material
alteration precludes the assertion of alteration as against
Continental where, as here, Continental paid the instrument
in good faith and in accordance with its reasonable commercial standards.
3.

The negligence stands as an absolute bar.

Clark and Service Tank Lines had no standing

to sue Continental:

(1) any warranty of title runs to

Continental's transferee (70A-3-417(2), U.C.A. 1953, and (2)
an action in conversion is not available against a depositary or collecting bank by the drawer.
Section 70A-3-417(2) provides that "any person who
transfers an instrument and receives consideration warrants
to his transferee, and if the transfer is by endorsement to
any subsequent holder who takes the instrument in good
faith," against defects in the instrument or possible claims
against the transferee or holder.

The warranty runs to the

transferee or a subsequent holder, such as the payor-drawee
bank or other banks in the collection process; it does not
run to the drawer of the instrument.

"Holder" is defined in

§70A-1-201(20) as "a person who is in possession of a document entitled or an instrument or an investment security
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bearer or in blank."

Clark and Service thus do not qualify

as and cannot be holders.

The warranties of §70A-3-417(2)

therefore run to the banks in the collection process and not
to the drawer.
The rationale for the warranties only running to
subsequent transferees or holders in a collection process is
that the Uniform Commercial Code creates certain defenses
which are appropriately raised by the drawee-payor bank.
For example, §70A-4-406(1) requires the drawee-payor bank's
customer to exercise reasonable care and promptness to
discover an alteration and to notify the bank promptly after
discovery.

Subsection (2) of §70A-4-406 provides the conse-

quences of the customer's failure:
"If the bank establishes that the
customer failed with respect to an item
to comply with the duties imposed on the
customer by subsection (1), the customer
is precluded from asserting against the
bank:
"(a) His unauthorized signature
or any alteration on the item if the
bank also establishes that it suffered
a loss by reason of such failure; and
"(b) An unauthorized signature or
alteration by the same wrongdoer on any
other item paid in good faith by the
bank after the first item and statement
was available to the customer for a
reasonable period not exceeding 14
calendar days and before the bank receives notification from the customer
of any such unauthorized signature or
alteration."
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437-8.
Other defenses are provided in §70A-4-406. Subsection (4) places a limitation period on discovery of an
alteration of an item.

It provides:

"Without regard to care or lack of care
of either the customer or the bank, a customer who does not within one year from the
time the statement and items are made
available to the customer (subsection (1))
discover and report . . . any alteration
on the face or back of the item . . . is
precluded from asserting against the bank
. . . such alteration."
Finally, subsection (5) of §70A-4-406 clearly
shows the rationale for requiring the drawor to proceed
against the drawee-payor bank.

It provides:

"If under this section a payor bank
has a valid defense against a claim of a
customer upon or resulting from payment
of an item and waives or fails upon request
to assert the defense, the bank may not
assert against any collecting bank or other
prior party presenting or answering the
item a claim based upon the unauthorized
signature or alteration giving rise to the
customer's claim."
The result is similar as to the claim of Clark and
Service Tank Lines against Continental for conversion.

The

action is properly brought against the drawee-payor bank
rather than against Continental directly.
In Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. First
National Bank & Trust Co. of Greenfield, 184 N.E.2d 358, 1
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drawer's cause of action against a depositary bank which
cashed checks for an individual, an employee of the plaintiff, who had forged the payee's endorsement on the checks,
which were never delivered to the payee, though otherwise
properly made and executed.

The Court held that the drawer

had no cause of action against the collecting bank which
cashed the checks and that the drawer had no rights in the
checks which should have been delivered to the payee. The
Court stated:
"The enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code opens the road for the adoption of what seems the peripheral view.
An action by the drawer against the collecting bank might have some theoretical
appeal as avoiding circuity of action.
. . . It would have been in the interest
of speedy and complete justice had the
case been tried with the action by the
drawer against the drawee and with an
action by the drawee against the collecting bank. . . . So one might ask: if
the drawee is liable to the drawer and
the collecting bank is liable to the
drawee, why not let the drawer sue the
collecting bank direct? We believe that
the answer lies in the applicable defenses
set up in the Code." (Footnote omitted.)
The Court referred to the defenses of §§3-406 (70A-3-406,
U.C.A. 1953), 4-406(4) (70A-4-406(4), U.C.A. 1953), and
4-406(5) (70A4-406(5), U.C.A. 1953), and in connection with
such defenses stated:
"If the drawer is allowed in the present case to sue the collecting bank, the
assertion of the defenses, for all practical purposes, would be difficult. The
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to compel resorting to litigation in every
case involving a forgery of commercial
paper. It is a result to be avoided."
Similarly, other counts of the plaintiff's complaint, for
money had and received, for conversion, and for negligence
were demurred to by the defendant, and the demurrer was
sustained by the trial court.

The Court on appeal affirmed

the demurrer and in reference to the cause of the plaintiff "s loss, the Court stated "the harm which befell the
plaintiff was the charging of its account by the drawee
bank."
The case of California Mill Sup. Corp. v. Bank
of Am.N.T.&S. Association, 223 P.2d 849 (Cal. 1950), reflects the importance of the rule that a drawer of a check
must proceed against the drawee-payor bank.

The drawer of

checks which it had issued upon the fraudulent representations of an employee brought an action against the defendant
collecting bank which had cashed and endorsed the checks and
collected thereon from the drawee bank, which in turn charged
the checks to plaintiff's account.

The drawer did not

discover the fraud of its employee for more than a year
after the payment of the last check.

By such lapse of time,

the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations,
and the drawer brought the action seeking to recover against
the collecting bank.

Citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
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in California Mill held that a drawer had no right of direct
action against the collecting bank upon the theory of an
express, contractual obligation, upon the theory of conversion, or upon the theory of money had and received.

See

also First National Bank v. North Jersey Trust Co., 14 A.2d
765 (N.J. 1940) and Trojan Publishing Corp. v. Manufacturers
Trust Co., 83 N.E.2d 465 (N.Y. 1948).
The following cases support the rule that a drawer
of a check cannot recover against a collecting bank since
the collecting bank's warranties do not extend to the maker
of the check, but only to subsequent transferees or holders:
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. San Francisco Bank, 136 P.2d
853 (Cal.App. 1943); Railroad Bldg. Loan & Sav. Assn. v.
Bankers Mortgage Co., 51 P.2d 61 (Kan. 1935); and First National Bank v. North Jersey Trust Co., 14 A.2d 765 (N.J.
1940).
Continental cites Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Guaranty
Bank & Trust Co., 370 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1966) as being "a
fact situation very similar to the instant case."

The

Aetna Casualty case is very dissimilar to the instant case
and the distinction reiterates the importance of the rule
that a drawer must proceed against the drawee-payor bank,
and not directly against depository or collecting banks.

In
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drawer as stated in the Brief of Appellant, page 23), placed
a rubber stamp endorsement on all checks received by and
made payable to Sandler-Ette, the payee.

The endorsement

procedure was within the employee's duties as office manager.

However, the checks were cashed by Guaranty Bank and

the money delivered to the bank's employee.

In this case,

the payee does not have the contractual relationship that a
drawer has to a drawee bank, but rather must seek its remedies against the bank paying the check upon the unauthorized
endorsement rather than to the actual payee or upon his
genuine endorsement.

Thus, the payee could seek its remedy

against Guaranty Bank, the cashing bank.

This situation is

similar to Irvine v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 3 U.C.C. 311
(1965).

The facts are almost identical in that the trust

company accepted certain checks made payable to the plaintiff for services rendered, but on which the plaintiff's
name was forged.

The Irvine court cited §3-419(1) (c) of

the Uniform Commercial Code (§70A-3-419(1)(c), U.C.A. 1953)
that "an instrument is converted when . . . it is paid on
the forged endorsement."

The Court then stated the rule

concerning the payee's rights against a depositary bank:
"To whom is the liability for the
conversion? Not, presumably, to the
drawer of the check for he is fully protected by his contract of deposit with
the drawee bank. Liability for a conversion is to the true owner of the check and
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checks in this case is, of course, the
plaintiff, the payee." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the Irvine case distinguishes the drawer's remedies
from the payee's remedies, and such must be done in the
instant case because certain defenses against a drawer are
known to and can only be raised by the drawee-payor bank.
Another aspect of the Aetna Casualty case distinguishes it from the case at bar.

The Court there held

that each time the office manager cashed his employer's
checks, the bank paid out its money and thereby suffered a
loss.

In the present case, the money paid out was that of

Clark or the drawee bank, the latter of which may have had
certain rights as against the depositary bank, subject to
the defenses authorized by the Uniform Commercial Code, but
there was no basis for the direct action by the drawer upon
the depositary bank.
4.

The claim of Clark is precluded because a

claim was not made upon Continental within one year from the
time the bank statement and cancelled check was made available to Clark by its drawee banks.
The Clark check was dated February 10, 1970, and
processed through normal banking channels.

Clark's action

was not brought until April 23, 1971 (Ex. 1), more than one
year after the check was processed and a statement and the
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Clark's action is,

therefore, precluded pursuant to Section 70A-4-406(4),
quoted above.

It is an absolute bar, "without regard to

care or lack of care of either customer or the bank."
5.

Continental cannot recover upon a claim of

breach of contract and the bond does not insure against
breach of contract.
The Clark/Service complaint included an allegation
that Continental breached its contract with Clark.

However,

Continental's complaint against St. Paul does not allege
that Clark and Service alleged breach of contract in their
action against Continental.

This points up Continental's

complete disregard of the Clark/Service complaint.
Point II.B of this Brief.

See

In addition, neither of the

checks involved in this action were drawn on Continental.
Any contract which Clark or Service had with Continental was
in connection with a checking account with Continental, with
checks drawable on such account.

Both checks involved here

were drawn on other banks, and Continental did not breach
any contract as to them.
Additionally, even if there were a breach of
contract, the bond does not insure against breach of contract, breach of trust, or negligence on the part of the
bank.

Continental assumes the bond insures against any loss
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has with St. Paul.

St. Paul does not insure that Continental

is an efficient, well-run bank.

As to coverage of a banker's

blanket bond, it has been said:
11

[I] t is not the intent of such bonds
to insure against losses resulting from
poor judgment, losses arising out of loans
unless there is a forgery or dishonesty
of employees, nor is it the purpose of
such bonds to insure the bank's operation
as a careful, well-managed bank." Fields,
"Banker's Blanket Bonds: What They Cover
and What They Do Not," 77 Banking Law
Journal 1001 (1960).
Any loss suffered by Continental, if from breach of contract, is not a loss covered by the bond.
In summary of this section, there can be no loss
for which St. Paul is required to indemnify Continental
where no facts would create a liability upon Continental.
Since Continental was not liable to Clark or Service as a
matter of law on the $32,500 and $10,272.22 checks, why then
did Continental pay $15,600 to settle the Clark/Service
complaint?

Recall the Fifth Cause of Action thereof claimed

$600,000 damages to Clark, the Bank's customer, on the
theory that the Bank failed to advise Clark of Stoof's
activities, thereby preventing Clark from learning of Stoof's
total embezzlements from Clark of $600,000.

Continental

makes no claim that St. Paul was bound to indemnify or
defend it as to that $600,000 claim, yet Continental now
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applied solely to the Clark and Service claims for breach of
contract or trust or negligence in Continental's handling of
the two checks of $32,500 and $10,272.22.

It is apparent

that Continental's settlement was made to settle the $600,000
damage claim and not to settle the claims on the two checks
as to which it had no liability.
CONCLUSION
Respondent St. Paul submits the trial court's
judgment should be affirmed.

The record clearly shows St.

'
(

i

Paul had no obligation to defend Continental in the Clark/
Service actions because (1) the allegations of the Clark/

I

Service complaint did not allege loss or risks within the
coverage of the bond, (2) Continental can show no facts

'

within bond coverage which establish that Continental was or

I
i

could have 'been liable to Clark or Service, and (3) ContiI
nental, as a matter of law, had no liability to Clark or
Service as to risks covered by the bond.
The judgment should be affirmed and Respondent St.
Paul should be awarded its costs.
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of November,
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